Assessing the Optimal Penalty for Consumer Protection Violations: The Economist's Toolkit
The Federal Trade Commission Act and a handful of state consumer protection statutes direct a trier of fact determining the optimal civil penalty assigned for a statute violation to weigh, among other factors: (1) the amount necessary to deter the alleged violator from continuing or repeating the violative conduct and (2) the amount the alleged violator is able to pay without causing harm to innocent parties.1 The former is effectively the minimum reasonable penalty; the latter is effectively the maximum reasonable penalty. The optimal penalty lies somewhere in between.
In this article, we describe, from an economic standpoint, the use of civil penalties as a means to deter companies from violating consumer protection laws and the importance of considering the alleged violator’s ability to pay. Economists have tools to assist a trier of fact in establishing the optimal penalty by estimating both the minimum penalty necessary to deter alleged violators from engaging in violative conduct and the maximum penalty an alleged violator can pay without causing collateral harm.
The Amount Necessary to Deter Future Violations
Certain states’ consumer protection statutes explicitly discuss deterrence as a goal of civil penalties. For example, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) requires the trier of fact to consider a penalty’s ability to deter future consumer protection violations;2 California’s Business and Professions Code (BPC) requires the court to consider the firm’s persistent misconduct (or other specified circumstances);3 and Washington’s Business Regulations require the attorney general to evaluate the maximum allowable penalty every five years to ensure that penalties effectively deter future violations.4
Even without state statutes specifically requiring the consideration of deterrence, this goal is clearly a priority of courts. During a recent hearing regarding claims by state attorneys general from Kentucky, California, Colorado, and New Jersey against Meta Platforms Inc.,5 U.S. District Judge Yvonne Gonzales Rogers stated that “[p]enalties are there to be penalties,” and Meta’s $4 million penalty estimate “is not even a slap on the hand. It’s not even that. That’s unreasonable.”6
Penalties play an important role in deterring future violations and limiting further harm to society. Under the premise that the penalty is considered “‘a sanction for doing what is forbidden,’”7 deterrence can be achieved if a firm expects the penalty to be greater than its gain from committing a violation.8 The penalty ought to be sufficiently high so as to result in total ex ante deterrence (i.e., firms are restrained from committing any level of violation in the future).9 The necessary amount, then, exceeds the expected gain after discounting for the probability of detection and punishment.10 Wouter P. J. Wils (2006) describes the logic of total deterrence in the antitrust context as follows:11
The idea of deterrence is to create a credible threat of penalties which weighs sufficiently in the balance of expected costs and benefits to deter calculating companies from committing antitrust violations. Deterrence through the use of fines will work if, and only if, from the perspective of the company contemplating whether or not to commit a violation, the expected fine exceeds the expected gain from the violation. The expected fine equals the nominal amount of the fine discounted by the probability that a fine is effectively imposed. . . . If, for instance, the probability of detection and punishment is one out of five, the expected fine is only one fifth of the nominal amount. In order to deter, the nominal amount of the fine must then be at least five times larger than the expected gain. The minimum fine for deterrence to work thus equals the expected gain from the violation multiplied by the inverse of the probability of a fine being effectively imposed.
This approach bases the minimum penalty on the alleged violator’s expected gain. For deterrence, the nominal penalty (n) multiplied by the probability of detection and punishment (p) needs to be greater than alleged violator’s expected gain (g) from engaging in the challenged conduct: n × p > g.
Because the minimum penalty necessary to deter future violations is determined by the ratio of (1) the alleged violator’s expected gain and (2) probability of detection and punishment, determining the minimum penalty relies on an assessment of these two factors.
1. The alleged violator’s expected gain
To accurately calculate an alleged violator’s expected gains from engaging in violative conduct, an economist can use the alleged violator’s internal projections of revenues generated by the conduct, costs related to engaging in the conduct, and discount rates. One would expect that alleged violators base their understanding of the potential value of the violative conduct on these forecasts and on the expected costs associated with obeying the relevant consumer protection statute.
However, this internal information may not be produced in the course of litigation or regulatory investigations. In the absence of this information, economists can approximate expected gains using actual gains. If, for example, an alleged violator produces information pertaining to the average revenue per unit of time and unit of violation (e.g., customer, product, etc.) and information pertaining to the number of violations per unit of time, an economist can estimate the revenue realized over the relevant period. If the alleged violator also produces information pertaining to the average costs per unit of time and unit of violation, one can estimate the realized profits or gains over the same period. Importantly, this approximation (after discounting for the probability of detection and punishment) would provide only the lower bound of the minimum penalty necessary to deter future violations. This estimate of actual gains does not consider savings related to the violation (i.e., costs associated with obeying the statute) and it does not account for the possibility that the alleged violator may invest and grow those gains.
2. Probability of detection and punishment
In the scenario where detection and punishment are guaranteed (probability equals one), the minimum penalty must be greater than the alleged violator’s expected gain: n × 1 > g, so n > g. In the scenario where detection and punishment are not guaranteed (probability is less than one), the minimum penalty must be greater than the alleged violator’s expected gain multiplied by the inverse of the probability; the lower the probability of detection and punishment, the higher the minimum penalty. For example, if the expected probability of detection and punishment is 0.5, n × 0.5 > g, so n > g × 2. If the expected probability of detection and punishment is 0.2, n × 0.2 > g, so n > g × 5.
In a sense, the higher penalty is compensating for the lower chance of detection and punishment; higher penalties increase the stakes of committing the violation. Put differently, keeping the penalty equal, a company is more likely to commit a violation if it does not expect its conduct to be detected or punished.12
Increasing the penalty may deter this company as much as in the scenario where detection and punishment are more or less guaranteed. Importantly, a higher probability of detection and punishment almost inevitably requires higher costs to society: enforcement bodies, funded by taxpayers, must use time and resources to investigate potential violators, bring charges against them, and carry out consequences.13
Assessing the probability of detection and punishment requires data or documents pertaining to enforcement bodies’ investigations and enforcement of similar conduct, as well as information pertaining to companies’ understanding of the probability of detection and punishment, which may not be produced by the alleged violator. The assessment also requires data on violations that occur without detection—conduct that is unlikely to be recorded. In the absence of this information, economists can present a range of the minimum penalty necessary to deter future violations under various probabilities of detection and enforcement.
Notably, Wils found that “prospective offenders are likely to overestimate the gain and underestimate the probability of detection and punishment.”14 Therefore, among the options presented by the economist, the trier of fact may choose the penalty associated with a lower probability of detection and punishment, which may better serve the deterrence goal. Furthermore, because higher probabilities of detection and punishment are associated with higher costs to society, minimum penalties assuming a higher probability of detection and punishment may be understated.
3. Previous penalties or settlements
While expected gains and the probability of detection and punishment may be difficult to estimate precisely, previous penalties or settlements assigned to the alleged violator or to similar companies engaging in similar conduct may be informative. The FTC Act and Texas’ DTPA each explain that the trier of fact ought to consider the alleged violator’s history of consumer protection violations.15
From an economic perspective, the penalties or settlements associated with the previous violations represent the cost of continuous engagement in the alleged violative conduct. An effective penalty, therefore, may need to be greater than previous penalties or settlements; this history can help establish the optimal penalty’s lower bound.
The Economic Effect on the Party Against Whom the Penalty is to be Assessed
While U.S. District Judge Yvonne Gonzales Rogers criticized Meta’s proposed $4 million penalty as “a slap on the hand,” her criticism did not spare state attorneys general from Kentucky, California, Colorado and New Jersey: The judge characterized the states' $1.4 trillion penalty proposal as "unreasonable.”16
Indeed, the proposed penalty represented over 85 percent of Meta’s market value.17
The FTC Act and Texas’ and California’s consumer protection statutes require the trier of fact to assess the alleged violator’s ability to pay a proposed penalty. The FTC Act explains that “the court shall take into account. . . ability to pay [and] effect on ability to continue to do business.”18
Texas’ DTPA requires the trier of fact to account for “the economic effect on the [party] against whom the penalty is to be assessed.”19 Among the circumstances a California court should consider, according to the BPC, is the alleged violator’s assets, liabilities, and value.20
The United States Sentencing Commission’s 2025 Guidelines recommend that courts consider “any collateral consequences of conviction, including civil obligations arising from the organization’s conduct” when deciding penalties.21 In other words, the guidelines suggest that civil penalties should not be such that alleged violators cannot pay without causing harm to innocent parties, including those who depend on alleged violators’ survival, such as their employees, consumers, and shareholders.22
Courts assigning penalties face a tradeoff between increasing deterrence (by increasing civil penalties) and limiting collateral consequences (by reducing civil penalties). Overestimating potential collateral consequences, or the value of harm that may be suffered as a result of the penalty, may have the adverse effect of undermining “the goals of corporate liability.”23
In his 2023 paper addressing this tradeoff, Nathan Atkinson proposes a methodology for calculating the maximum penalty a firm could pay without causing “unintended negative impacts on employees, customers, and society more broadly.”24 Atkinson bases his methodology on the United States Sentencing Guidelines’ notion that these unintended negative impacts (collateral consequences) are a result of a firm’s inability to pay an assigned penalty.25 Notably, Atkinson found that “20.6% of solvent firms. . . have had their fines explicitly reduced because of concerns about financial distress.”26 By unnecessarily decreasing penalties, courts may undermine the penalty’s ability to deter malfeasance.27
Atkinson presents three metrics that can be used to assess a firm’s ability to pay a proposed penalty.28 Under the first metric, Atkinson proposes comparing the firm’s cash and assets that can be easily converted into cash, including marketable securities and accounts receivable (“quick assets”)29 to the firm’s current liabilities.30 If the ratio of quick assets to current liabilities (“Quick Ratio”) is larger than one, the firm would be able to pay a penalty equal to the difference between the value of quick assets and the current liabilities without facing short-term financial distress.31Atkinson notes that the Quick Ratio is “very conservative” as it “only considers assets that can be converted quickly to cash but includes all current liabilities (those due within the next year). Quick [a]ssets thereby excludes inventory and other current assets that the firm could liquidate in order to pay a fine.”32
Atkinson’s second proposed metric relies on a comparison of the firm’s current assets (assets that a company expects to convert into cash within the next operating cycle, which is typically a year)33 and the firm’s current liabilities.34 If the ratio of current assets to current liabilities (“Current Ratio”) is larger than one, the firm is able to pay a penalty equal to the difference between the firm’s current assets and its current liabilities within the next year.35Atkinson explains that the “Current Ratio gives a better picture [than the Quick Ratio] of the firm’s financial state over the coming year. So even if. . . the firm may not have the ability to pay the fine speedily, the Current Ratio may. . . [indicate] that the firm does have the liquidity to pay the fine within the next year.”36
However, even if the Quick and Current Ratios are less than one, Atkinson can apply his third metric. He explains that a firm with a higher book value37 or market capitalization38 as compared to the proposed penalty may more easily raise funds through equity or debt financing, equity issuance, or asset sales39 to pay the full, unreduced penalty, pay the penalty sooner, or lessen short-term financial distress.40
According to Atkinson, a firm in this position is unlikely to risk collateral consequences by fundraising, should it choose to do so. Furthermore, he explains that “[l]ow or negative net current assets appear to drive officials’ fears of collateral consequences and the resultant reductions in corporate liability. . . . Negative current assets, however, should not be confused with financial distress.”41
Establishing the Optimal Penalty
Economists have the tools to establish appropriate bounds of an optimal penalty. As shown above, civil penalties offer the unique opportunity to consider factors such as deterrence and collateral harm.42 Unlike the assessment of compensatory damages, which require an economist to focus on the relationship between the alleged violative conduct and consumer harm, the assessment of optimal penalties allows economists to explore additional goals of monetary punishments.
This year has seen a rise in consumer protection enforcement by state attorneys general.43In the first two quarters of 2026, states have already surpassed total enforcement filings in each of the two years prior.44 With the assistance of economists, these enforcement actions afford states a tool distinct from compensatory damages — one aimed not at quantifying harm, but at calibrating the optimal penalty to deter future violations without causing collateral harm.
CITATIONS
[1]15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(C). “In determining the amount of such a civil penalty, the court shall take into account the degree of culpability, any history of prior such conduct, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, and such other matters as justice may require.” As of January 17, 2025, the maximum civil penalty is $53,088. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Adjustments to Civil Penalty Amounts, 90 Fed. Reg. 5,582 (2025).
[2] Texas Deceptive Trade Practices—Consumer Protection Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. §§ 17.41–17.63 (2025) (“DTPA”), § 17.47(c). The DTPA states that the Office of the Texas Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division may request, and the trier of fact may award, a civil penalty to be paid to the State in an amount of not more than $10,000 per violation. DTPA § 17.47(g) specifies that “[i]n determining the amount of penalty imposed under Subsection (c), the trier of fact shall consider:
- the seriousness of the violation, including the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of any prohibited act or practice;
- the history of previous violations;
- the amount necessary to deter future violations;
- the economic effect on the person against whom the penalty is to be assessed;
- knowledge of the illegality of the act or practice; and
- any other matter that justice may require.”
The penalty’s ability to deter future violations may depend in part on the violator’s history of previous violations.
[3] California Business and Professions Code provides that those who engage or propose to engage in unfair competition (§ 17206) and those who violate California’s General Business Regulations Part 3 – Representations to the Public, Chapter 1 – Advertising § 17536) are liable for a civil penalty not to exceed $2,500 per violation. “In assessing the amount of the civil penalty, the court shall consider any one or more of the relevant circumstances presented by any of the parties to the case, including, but not limited to, the following: the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, the number of violations, the persistence of the misconduct, the length of time over which the misconduct occurred, the willfulness of the defendant’s misconduct, and the defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net worth.” (California Code, Business and Professions Code, CA. Bus. & Prof. Code (“BPC”), §§ 17206, 17536.)
[4] Revised Code of WA—Business Regulations, RCW, § 19.86.140: “By December 1, 2022, and every five years thereafter, the office of the attorney general shall evaluate the efficacy of the maximum civil penalty amounts. . . in deterring violations of the consumer protection act.”
[5] In re: Social Media Adolescent Addiction/Personal Injury Products Liability Litigation, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Case No. 4:22-md-03047.
[6] Dorothy Atkins, “Judge Decries ‘Extreme’ Penalty Bids in Social Media MDL,” Law360, July 17, 2026, https://www.law360.com/articles/2502815/print?section=california (“Atkins (2026)”).
[7] Wouter P. J. Wils, “Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice,” World Competition, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2006, https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2006014 (“Wils (2006)”), p. 14.
[8] Id., p. 12.
[9] While penalties’ role in deterring future violations and discouraging further harm to society is uncontroversial, economists differ in what they consider the “optimal” level of violation to be deterred. For example, Gary Becker’s 1974 seminal paper suggests that a penalty ought to be just large enough so as to deter firms from committing an “inefficient” level of violation while allowing a violation so long as the firm’s gain from the violation is greater than society’s loss from the violation. See Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” in Gary S. Becker and William M. Landes (eds.), Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/books/beck74-1, 1974, 1–54 (“Becker (1974)”). In this approach, firms “internalize” society’s harm (i.e., take the harm into consideration when deciding the “appropriate” level of violation).
This “internalization” approach is more difficult to apply effectively because the factors that determine the harm to society are “very hard to quantify in practice, which means that the imposition of fines will be administratively costly and/or that errors will be made, which will weaken deterrence.” (Wils (2006), pp. 14–15.) Becker himself admitted that “harm done is not easily measured, and serious mistakes would be inevitable.” (Becker (1974), p. 34.)
[10] See Wils (2006), p. 2. See also Becker (1974), p. 9; Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso, Giancarlo Spagnolo, and Cristiana Vitale, “Deterrence in Competition Law,” SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper, No. 285, Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), Münche, 2009, https://doi.org/10.5282/ubm/epub.13269 (“Buccirossi et al. (2009)”), p. 3; Catherine Craycraft, Joseph L. Craycraft, and Joseph C. Gallo, “Antitrust Sanctions and a Firm’s Ability to Pay,” Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 12, 1997, 171–183, https://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1007718618005 (“Craycraft et al. (1997)”), p. 173; William M. Landes, “Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations,” The University of Chicago Law Review, 1993, 652–678, https://doi.org/10.2307/1599506, p. 657.
[11] Wils (2006), p. 12.
[12] Becker (1974), p. 9.
[13] See Becker (1974), pp. 14, 25–26. See also Wils (2006), p. 9. These costs must be factored into the equation: n × p > g + costs to society of detection.
[14] Wils (2006), p. 2.
[15] 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(C). “In determining the amount of such a civil penalty, the court shall take into account. . . any history of prior such conduct.) See also §17.47(g).
[16] Atkins (2026).
[17] Meta Platforms Inc.’s weighted-average shares used to compute earnings per share was 2,543,000,000 (basic) or 2,566,000,000 (diluted). (Meta Platforms, Inc., Form 10-Q For the Quarterly Period Ended June 30, 2026, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, https://investor.gm.com/sec-filings/sec-filing/10-q/0001467858-25-000121, Condensed Consolidated Statements of Income.) Meta Platform Inc.’s closing stock price on July 17, 2026, was $646.01. (Meta Platforms, Inc., Historical Data, Yahoo Finance.) $646.01 × 2,543,000,000 = $1.64 trillion. $1.4 trillion / $1.6 trillion = 87.5%.
[18]15 U.S.C. §45, §45(m).
[19] DTPA § 17.47(g).
[20] BPC §§ 17206, 17536.
[21] United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.8(a)(3) (2025). https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines.
[22] See e.g., Nathan Atkinson, “Corporate Liability, Collateral Consequences, and Capital Structure,” Columbia Business Law Review, 2023, https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2023i1.11897 (“Atkinson (2023)”), pp. 9–10; Craycraft et al. (1997), p. 176.
Caroline Crenshaw, a former commissioner of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, argued that shareholders should not be considered innocent parties who may suffer collateral harm. If penalties only negatively impact those who benefited from the malfeasance, the penalty would do “no more than disgorg[e] the proceeds of corporate wrongdoing. . . . If our penalties were limited in such a way, the price of getting caught might not be high enough to deter misconduct.” (Caroline A. Crenshaw, Moving Forward Together – Enforcement for Everyone [Speech Transcript], U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, March 9, 2021, https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/crenshaw-moving-forward-together, p. 5.) In other words, the ability of a penalty to deter violations may be strengthened by its effect (if any) on shareholders, even those who did not benefit from the challenged conduct, and especially on those who have the ability to affect change in the company.
[23] Atkinson (2023), p. 5. Officials may overestimate potential collateral consequences by basing their calculations “on unfounded concerns about financial distress.” (Atkinson (2023), p. 5.)
[24] Atkinson (2023), p. 1. The penalty that would most effectively keep a firm accountable for its actions is equal to the maximum penalty a firm could pay without causing collateral consequences. (Atkinson (2023), p. 45.)
[25] Atkinson (2023), p. 6.
[26] Atkinson (2023), p. 6.
[27] Buccirossi et al. (2009) explain that “linking fines to the firms’ ability to pay, so as to always avoid bankruptcy. . . entails the double risk of generating distorted incentives for compliance for wrongdoers differing only in their financial situation, and of inducing firms to issue more debt to reduce their (apparent) ability to pay, and, thereby, the level of expected fines.” (Buccirossi et al. (2009), p. 11.) According to this logic, alleged violators with a lower ability to pay should not be held to a lower standard (assigned a lower fine) than companies with a higher ability to pay for a violation resulting in equal harm.
[28] Atkinson (2023), pp. 34–37.
[29] Quick assets include only “assets likely to be converted to cash within a relatively short period of time, usually less than 90 days.” Quick assets exclude “inventories and prepaid assets.” (Michelle L. Hanlon, Robert P. Magee, Glenn M. Pheiffer, and Thomas R. Dyckman, Financial & Managerial Accounting for Decision Makers, 4th ed., Cambridge Business Publishers, 2021 (“Hanlon et al. (2021)”), p. 236.)
[30] “Current liabilities are those liabilities that come due within the next year.” Financial analysts refer to the ratio of cash, marketable securities, and accounts receivable to current liabilities as the “Quick Ratio.” (Hanlon et al. (2021), pp. 235–236.)
[31] Atkinson (2023), pp. 34–35.
Quick assets – current liabilities = x. Current liabilities + x = quick assets. A firm breaks even by paying a penalty of x.
[32] Atkinson (2023), p. 35.
[33] Hanlon et al. (2021), p. 235.
[34] Financial analysts refer to the ratio of current assets to current liabilities as the “Current Ratio.” (Hanlon et al. (2021), p. 235.)
[35] Current assets – current liabilities = x. Current liabilities + x = current assets. A firm breaks even by paying a penalty of x.
[36] Atkinson (2023), p. 35. “If a firm has a Current Ratio that is greater than one after paying the fine, officials should not look further into the firm’s finances. While it is possible that a firm may have a Current Ratio greater than one while having distressed longer-term finances, the Quick Ratio and Current Ratio give an indication of whether the firm can pay the fine without additional short-term financing, and officials should stop there.” (Atkinson (2023), p. 35.)
[37] Book value is “the firm’s total present-day value if all assets were liquidated and all liabilities were repaid.” Firms with “positive book values can generally borrow against their assets and future earnings, because lenders know that the firm could be liquidated to pay back the loan if necessary.” (Atkinson (2023), p. 37.)
[38] Market capitalization is “the total market value of the company’s outstanding shares of stock” (i.e., the perceived value of the corporation). “Market capitalization captures the expected discounted future stream of income to shareholders. A firm with positive market capitalization has the scope to raise money to pay a fine by borrowing money or issuing equity.” (Atkinson (2023), p. 36.)
[39] Atkinson (2023), pp. 36–38.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Id., pp. 27–28.
[42] This article focuses on the scenario where the amount necessary to deter is less than the amount the alleged violator has the ability to pay. In the scenario where the reverse is true, economists may consider alternative measures of the optimal penalty, or the trier of fact may determine which factor takes priority in the given case.
[43] See Sammuel Auld, Margaret E. Krawiec, Evan R. Kreiner, Michael H. Menitove, Julia K. York, and Todd D. Kelly, “The Rise of State Antitrust and Consumer Protection Enforcement,” Skadden, September 24, 2026, https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2026/09/insights-september-2026/the-rise-of-state-antitrust-and-consumer-protection-enforcement; “States Expanding Antitrust and Consumer Protection Scrutiny,” The Conference Board, June 23, 2026, https://www.conference-board.org/research/ceo-center-newsletters-alerts/states-expanding-antitrust-and-consumer-protection-scrutiny; Caroline Cease, Brian Hauck, Venus D. Johnson, and Carson Smith, “Regulation in the Midst of Deregulation: State AGs Fill the Federal Enforcement Void,” Jenner & Block, September 24, 2026, https://www.jenner.com/en/news-insights/client-alerts/regulation-in-the-midst-of-deregulation-state-ags-fill-the-federal-enforcement-void; Nowell D. Bamberger, Tom Bednar, Christopher R. Kavanaugh, Joon H. Kim, and Jennifer Kennedy Park, “State Attorneys General Increase Investigations in Response to Perceived Federal Gaps,” Cleary Gottlieb, May 26, 2026, https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/state-attorneys-general-increase-investigations-in-response-to-perceived-federal-gaps.
[44] Sammuel Auld, Boris Bershteyn, Evan R. Kreiner, Karen M. Lent, Michael H. Menitove, and Julia K. York, “The Expanding Role of State AGs in Antitrust and Consumer Protection Enforcement,” Skadden, July 21, 2026, https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2026/07/the-expanding-role-of-state-ags.
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