Assessing the Optimal Penalty for Consumer Protection Violations: The Economist's Toolkit

11.19.2026

The Federal Trade Commission Act and a handful of state consumer protection statutes direct a trier of fact determining the optimal civil penalty assigned for a statute violation to weigh, among other factors: (1) the amount necessary to deter the alleged violator from continuing or repeating the violative conduct and (2) the amount the alleged violator is able to pay without causing harm to innocent parties.1 The former is effectively the minimum reasonable penalty; the latter is effectively the maximum reasonable penalty. The optimal penalty lies somewhere in between.

In this article, we describe, from an economic standpoint, the use of civil penalties as a means to deter companies from violating consumer protection laws and the importance of considering the alleged violator’s ability to pay. Economists have tools to assist a trier of fact in establishing the optimal penalty by estimating both the minimum penalty necessary to deter alleged violators from engaging in violative conduct and the maximum penalty an alleged violator can pay without causing collateral harm.

You can read this full article here, in the ABA Antitrust Law Section.

CITATIONS

[1]15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(C). “In determining the amount of such a civil penalty, the court shall take into account the degree of culpability, any history of prior such conduct, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, and such other matters as justice may require.” As of January 17, 2025, the maximum civil penalty is $53,088. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Adjustments to Civil Penalty Amounts, 90 Fed. Reg. 5,582 (2025).

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